Jaina Philosophy: Useful Notes on Jaina Philosophy!
Like other philosophical schools, the Jainas have also critically examined the valid sources of knowledge. But Naya is a distinctive feature of the Jaina system.
According to Jaina philosophers, knowledge is of two kinds, viz., Pramana and Nay a. Pramana refers to the knowledge of a things it is.
Naya is the knowledge of a thing in a particular context or in relationship with the knower. Naya, in other words, is that particular standpoint from which we deliver put judgment about a particular thing.
Nayas would thus differ with differing standpoints, and every naya gives us relative knowledge. According to the Jainas, everything possesses an infinite number of qualities (dharma). When we affirm a thing by one of these manifold qualities, we apprehend naya. But when we know a thing in different ways and through different qualities, this knowledge comes through Pramana. Thus both pramana and naya are essential for the full and true knowledge of a thing.
Kinds of Pramana:
Like other philosophers, the Jainas also divide knowledge gained through Pramana into two categories, viz., direct (Paroksha) and indirect (Aparoksha). But there is only a relative difference between the two. Indirect is only relatively indirect, and direct is only relatively direct. According to Siddhasena Diwakar, Pramana is that knowledge which illuminates itself and others without any hindrance.
Therefore, Pramanas, both direct and indirect, enlighten themselves as well as others. Obviously, direct knowledge is the correct knowledge of a thing. It is gained by the soul unaided by mind or the sense organs. For Umaswami, perception (Pratyaksha) is that knowledge which the soul attains without any help. So perception is valid in its own right (SvatahPramana). In indirect Pramana, a thing is known by hetu. Thus process of knowledge is known as inference Anumana). It is to be noted here that originally the Jaina philosophers were very fastidious about their conception of direct knowledge. For them, only that knowledge was direct which was unaided by mind or sense organs. But later on, the Jaina philosophers who followed the earlier ones, widened its scope from the practical point of view and included knowledge through mind and sense organs also within the fold of direct knowledge.
Kinds of Direct Knowledge:
Direct knowledge is either practical (Vyavharika) or other-worldly (Parmar- thika). Other-worldly knowledge is immune from the effect of actions and illuminates independently without the help of mind or sense organs. In it, exists a direct connection between the knower and the known. Unless one is free from the shackles of actions one cannot have this kind of knowledge, and hence the destruction of actions is a sine quo non for the attainment of other-worldly knowledge. This is the genuine knowledge and it is this which sheds light on all the objects of the universe. Practical or mundane knowledge is to be distinguished from the other-worldly, inasmuch as the former is achieved through the mind and the sense organs while the latter requires no such media. Again, while the former can be acquired by the common folk, the latter cannot be acquired by all and sundry.
Mati and Sruta Jnana:
Direct practical knowledge is of two kinds—Mati and Sruta. Following are the differences between the Mati and Sruta knowledge:
(1) In the former, the object of perception is present, but in the latter the object may belong to past, present or future.
(2) The latter is related to jainagama. So it is superior to the former.
(3) The latter, being the utterance of great ones (Aptavachana) is pure and beyond parinama, while the former is subject to the effect of parinama.
Kinds of Mati Knowledge:
According to the Jaina philosophers, Mati knowledge springs in the following order:
It is the first stage, of knowledge produced through the contact of sense-organs with the objects. It is also known as Sammugdha, Alochana, Graliana and Avadharana. Avagraha has been subdivided into Vijnanavagraha and Arthavagraha. In the former, there is nothing more than the contact between the subject and the object, while in the latter the subject not only apprehends the object, but also feels it
This stage follows that of Avagraha. In it the soul is able to appreciate the qualities of the visible object. For example, on hearing noise, one does not, in the beginning, know whose noise it is or what is its source. This is the stage of Avagraha. Iha comes when one feels the curiosity of knowing the source from which the noise is coming forth.
In this stage one comes to know about the object definitely. To pursue the above-mentioned example, one enters the stage of Avaya when one is able to locate the source of the noise definitely.
This stage when the full knowledge about the object leaves an impression (Samskara) upon the heart (Antahkarana) of the man. This is the final stage of direct knowledge. Recollection, perception and inference are all included in this stage.
Kinds of Sruta Knowledge:
Sruta knowledge, is .derived through words. It is produced by the words which we here. It is gained from authoritative books and words which we hear. It is gained from authoritative books and words of great sages. Perusal of authoritative books and listening to the sermons of saints are essential for this kind of knowledge. Knowledge through the sense organs is thus the prerequisite of Sruta knowledge. Mati knowledge precedes Sruta knowledge. The preachings of the Tirthankars fall in the latter category.
Sruta knowledge is divided into two categories, viz., Angavahya and Angapravistha. The former is mentioned in the Jaina scriptures, while the Sruta knowledge outside the pale of the religious books of the Jainas, falls in the latter category. Angapravistha is regarded superior to Angavahya.
Kinds of Parmarthika direct knowledge:
Parmarthika direct knowledge falls into two subdivisions, viz., kewala jnana and vikala jnana. Parmarthika direct knowledge automatically dawns upon a man without the help of sense organs or mind as soon as he is free from the effect of Ghatity and Aghatiya actions. If it is correct knowledge of the whole subject it is termed kevala or sakala jnana. It is achieved only by Arhatas, who are free from attachment and jealousy. This is the best of all knowledge. But when this knowledge pertains to only a specific subject it is known as vikala knowledge.
Kinds of vikala knowledge:
Vikala other-worldly, indirect knowledge has also been divided into Avadhi and Manah-paryaya. The former follows partial emancipation from actions. A person, endowed with it, can perceive substance which is at a distance, or which is invisible or indistinct. When the shrouding knowledge is removed, this type of knowledge is attained by gods instinctively and by men and other lower beings with some effort on their part.
Being the knowledge of only limited things, it is known as Avadhi knowledge. It can be achieved by all, but Manah paryaya knowledge is the privilege of the saints only. The latter is a refined and subtle type of knowledge.
With its help other people apprehend things of the present, which have limited dimensions. When knowledge is unveiled, people attain it by right character. Possessed of the quality of penetrating into the hearts of other, it is known as manah paryaya.
All kinds of substances are known with the help of Mati and Sruti Concrete substance is the object of Avadhi jnana. Subtle substance is known through Mati In all these four types of knowledge, one cannot know the objects which are produced by the modifications of substance. The knowledge of paryayas is the object of Kevala jnana.
Indirect knowledge is of five kinds—smriti, pratyabhijna, Tarka, Anumana and Agam. These will be now discussed in detail.
1. Smriti (Memory):
To recollect something known directly in the past as a result of the awakening of some impression is known as Smriti or memory. Impression (Samskara) is a peculiar capacity of the soul. Not only direct perception of the past, but recollection, recognition, logic and inference of the past also leave impressions upon the soul. So these may also arouse memory. For the Jainas, memory is valid knowledge, because it is the correct form of things perceived in the past.
2. Pratyabhijna (Recognition):
It is the synthetic knowledge contributed by direct perception and recollection. In it one knows resemblance (Samanata), identity (Tadatmya), difference (Bheda), comparison (Tulana) etc. In it one knows the general (Samanya) in the form of similar change (Sadrisa parinama) of different Jivas and Ajivas. Recognition is valid knowledge of a special kind. In it one sees a thing in the present in the form of that which one perceived in the past, e.g., this is that Deva Dutt. Direct perception apprehends, ‘This’. Recognition enables us to know that “This is that”. Pratyabhijna is the knowledge of such things as cannot be known otherwise. It is the correct knowledge of a thing. It is not in contradiction with other valid sources of knowledge. The Jaina philosophers do not recognize comparison as separate valid source of knowledge. They include it in recognition.
3. Tarka (Reasoning):
Tarka is the knowledge of concomitance (Vyapti) between paksha and sadhya. It depends upon the perception whether two things exist together or not, in the past, the present and the future. Concomitance is of two kinds, viz., Anvaya Vyapti and Vyatireka Vyapti.
In the former, the concomitance of two things is established; in the latter, concomitance is shown only by their absence. ‘Where there is fire, there is smoke’ is an illustration of Anvaya Vpati. “Where there is no fire, there is no smoke,”exemplifies Vyatireka Vyapti’. The relationship of universal accompaniment—gradual or concurrent—exists in Vyapti. This relationship is ascertained by reasoning.
4. Anumana (Inference):
Inference is the knowledge of Sadhya with the help of hetu. This inference is either svarthanumana or pararthanumana. The former is the inference for one’s own self. Hence it needs no amplification. For example, the frequent visibility of fire and smoke together suffices to convince us of their concomitance. Afterwards, when one sees smoke, one infers the existence of fire also with the help of Vyapti, which is already known to us.
It is svarthanumana. In it, the place of smoke ispaksha, smoke ispakslm dhtuma. In svarthanumana, only Vyapti and paksha, dharma are essential. Pararthanumana, on the other hand, is used for convincing others. So it must be more systematized and vivid. It is live-fold. In five-fold pararthanumana, an inference is drawn in five sentences.
These sentences are called the propositions (Avayava) to inference e.g.:
(i) Pratijna—The hill is fiery.
(ii) Hutu—Because of smoke.
(iii) Drislitanta. Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, such as in the kitchen.
(iv) Upanaya. The smoke, which does not exist without fire, is in the hills.
(v) Nigamana. Therefore the hill is fiery.
Bhadra Bahu has mentioned the following Dasavayava Pararthanumana.
Eschewing violence is the highest virtue.
2. Pratijna Vibhakti:
According to the view of Jaina Tirthankars, eschewing violence is the highest good.
Eschewing violence is the greatest good, because he who eschews violence earns the love of Gods and to respect them is the religious duty of men.
4. Hetu vibhakti:
None but the eschewers of violence are permitted to live in the celestial world.
But those who despise the Jaina Tirthankars and take recourse to violence are the beloved of Gods. They also deserve to be honoured by regions people. Those who commit violence in yajna live in heaven.
6. Vipaksha Pratisedhu:
The Jaina Tirthankaras derogate those persons, who commit violence, such persons do not earn respect and regard. They are also not liked by the Gods.
Arhat and Jaina sages do not themselves prepare their meals, lest they should unwittingly commit violence. They take their meals prepared by others in some household.
The food prepared in a household includes that which is prepared for the Jaina saints and the arhats. The preparation of the food involves violence. The Jaina saints and arhats also naturally share the responsibility for this sin of violence. Hence, the invalidity of the above-mentioned example.
9. Asanika Pratisedha:
The arhats and Jaina sages do not inform the householders of their arrival. They also do not go for begging at fixed times. So it is not correct to say that the householders prepare food for them. So the arhats and Jaina saints have no connection whatsoever with the sin of violence involved in the preparation of food by the householders.
Therefore, eschewing violence is the greatest good.
The basis for defects in inference:
These are three chief steps in the process of inference, viz. Paksha, Sadhya and Hetu. Sadhya is to be proved. The basis and the reason for proving it are known as ‘Paksha’ and ‘Hetu’ respectively. The de-integration of the relationship of the three exposes fallacies of inference. The fallacies are as follows.
Where the basis for Sadhya is either destroyed or is an impossibility, there is the fallacy of pakshabhas. In other words, though it has a plausible semblance with the paksha, yet as a matter of fact, it is not paksha.
It is of three kinds which are as follows—
This fallacy is found in assertions which cannot be proved. For example: “He is handsome, because he is the son of a barren woman.” This sentence is asiddha, because a barren woman does not give birth to a son.
That which is contrary to visual perception, e.g., “Fire is not a liquid.”
Where one finds mutually contradictory judgments, e.g., “Soul is ephemeral because it is knowledge and it is eternal because it is existent.” Here, the former judgment suffers from Anaikantika, as only the latter which contradicts it is correct.
The two other kinds of Hetvabhas are termed is Drishtantabhas and Dusanabltas.
It is the knowledge of a thing through the words of reliable people. A person who knows things in their true form and expresses his views correctly, is reliable and Apia. He is free from prejudice. His words befit the truth which they are seeking to express. Again is of two kinds, viz., Mundane (laukika) and Supramundane (alaukika). The words of Janaka, etc., are laukika. The words of the Tirthamkaras are alaukika. The Jainas do not believe in the Vedas.
They have faith only in the Tirthamkaras, who have attained perfection and realized all knowledge. Just as a lamp illuminates a thing, so word also manifests a thing by its inherent power. But its meaning also depends upon customs and traditions. Its truth or falsehood is determined by the virtues or vices of the speaker.
Three kinds of false Knowledge:
Some Jaina philosophers believe in eight kinds of knowledge which can be classified as authentic and fallacious. Mati, Sruta, Avadhi, Manah Prayaya and Kevala are regarded as true or authentic knowledge. On the other hand, fallacious knowledge (Mithya Jnana) includes samasya, viparyaya, and A nadhyavasaya. The first five of these have already been discussed.
Samasya is that knowledge which admits doubt, suspicion and misgiving. It has its effect upon Mati and Sruta knowledge. Knowledge, which is contrary to truth is dubbed as viparyaya. It is found in Avadhi. False knowledge due to negligence or indifference is known as Anadhyavasya.
According to the Jainas, perfect knowledge suffers from no loopholes whatsoever. It is singularly free from Samasya, Vimoha and Vibhrama. Delusion, deception or suspicion cannot assail it.
The types of knowledge mentioned above belong to the class of Pramana i.e., knowledge of a thing as it is. The knowledge of a thing in a particular context or relationship is termed Naya. Mistaking this relative knowledge for perfect knowledge is an error, which is known as Nayabhas.
Naya is mainly of two kind’s viz., Artlia Naya and Sabda Naya. The former is concerned with the meaning of objects, while the latter deals exclusively with words. Artlia Naya is further sub divided into four categories.
These are as follows:
1. Naigama Naya:
According to Siddhasena, Naigama Naya comes in, when we do not distinguish between the general and the particular attributes of an object, though we are fully aware of them. According to Pujyapada it is connected with that purpose of an action, which is present throughout in that action from the beginning to the end. For example, a person is carrying fire, water and pot, etc. When questioned about his purpose in doing all this, he will reply that he is going to prepare food. Here all the different actions are governed by one single purpose, viz., the preparation of food.
2. Samgraha Naya:
In it, general qualities are specially emphasized. Though the general when divorced from the particular has no separate existence of its own, yet the observation of the general also leads to the knowledge of many things. Out of the general and the particular if either is emphasized at the cost of the other, arises an error known as Nayabhas.
Samyakh and Advaita Vedanta philosophies have neglected the particular. On the other hand, the Buddhists do not recognize the general. The Nyaya Vaisesika philosophers recongnise both, yet they regard the difference between them as absolute. The Jainas, on the contrary, regard this distinction as relative. Samgraha Naya has been subdivided into two categories, Parasamgraha is the highest general outlook for which all the objects are part of the extant object. Aparasamgraha Naya dilates upon the general traits of different kinds.
3. Vyavhara Naya:
It is the outlook of common people, based upon practical knowledge. In it, objects are considered in their concrete forms and their particular traits are emphasized. When it pays exclusive attention to peculiar traits and takes them as the whole truth, it tends to overlook the general traits and this leads to Nayabhasa. Materialism and Realistic Pluralism are the pertinent instances of this.
4. Rju sutra Naya:
It shuts eyes completely to the existence of the thing in the past or in the future and holds that a thing is a mere conglomeration of characteristics which may be said to produce effects at any given moment. Thus, it is narrower in its scope than even Vyavhara Naya. This Naya is very useful in particular circumstances. But taking it as absolute truth leads to Nayabhasa.
In addition to the above mentioned four Artha Nayas there are three Sabda Nayas which are as follows—
1. Sabda Naya:
According to it, every word has a special meaning which must be necessarily kept in view. The word denotes something specific—quality, relation or action. In this connection it should be remembered that the same meaning may be conveyed by more than one word. Moreover, a word and its meaning have relative relationship. If we do keep this in view, we are exposed to Nayabhasa.
2. Samabhirudh Naya:
It implies the splitting of words according to their roots. For example, the literal meaning of the word Pamkaja is one born out of mud (Pamka), but this word is used exclusively for lotus.
3. Evambhut Naya:
It is narrower than even Samabhirudh Naya. According to it, a particular object can be referred to by a particular name, only when the meaning of the particular root, from which that particular word is derived, applies to it fully. Thus the cow can be termed as Gavayah, only when it is moving. Otherwise the cow should be referred to by some other appropriate word.
The above-mentioned Nayas are given in a descending order so that each subsequent is narrower than its antecedent in scope and meaning. Thus Evambhut is the narrowest and Naigam is the widest. Every Naya is one of those many viewpoints from which a thing can be viewed. To regard any of these viewpoints as absolute is fallacious and leads to Nayabhasa Dristi.
According to the Jainas, the Nyaya Vaisesika, the Samkhya, the Advaitavedanta and the Buddhist philosophers regard the first four Nayas mentioned above as the ultimate and absolute truth. For the Jainas, however, a perfect vision implies a synthesis of all those different Nayas. This perfect vision is termed by them as Naya Nischaya. It is also of two kinds, viz. Suddha Nischaya and Asuddha Nischaya. In Suddha Nischaya, one knows the real object stripped of conditions (upadhis). In Asuddha Nischaya, one knows the conditional stages of an object.
Dravyarthika and Paryayarthika Naya:
The Jainas have divided Naya into two separate categories viz., Dravyarthika and Prayayarthika Naya. The former considers an object in the light of its substance, while the latter keeps in view the modifications and conditions of the object concerned.
Syadvada or Saptabhangi Naya is the most important part of the Jaina logic. Syadvada is neither scepticism nor agnosticism. In fact syadvada is the theory of the relativity of knowledge. The form, substance, scope and time of every existing object are only in relation to those of some other object. Therefore, the knowledge of any object is not absolute but relative.
According to the Jainas, reality is neither eternal nor ephemeral. It cannot also be regarded as both eternal and ephemeral in different forms. It is changeable, but it never loses its own self. Every object has more than one attribute. The Kevali can have direct knowledge of all these different attributes of an object. But an ordinary mortal can see only one object and only from one standpoint at a time. So when one considers an object one must keep its different attributes in view. This theory of regarding reality as many-sided, eternal and ephemeral, animate and inanimate, etc., is termed Anckantavada. It is also known as Parinamanityatvavada. Syadvada is based on this theory.
Durniti Naya and Pramana:
According to the Jainas, an object can be mainly viewed in three ways. The knowledge, which views the part as the whole, is known as Durniti. If knowledge is regarded as it is, without judging it to be either partial or absolute, then it is termed Naya. When the knowledge is accompanied by the consciousness that it is limited, relative and conditional and that it can be interpreted in different ways according to different standpoints, it is termed as Prainana or Syad sat.
To denote Prainana, the epithet Syat must precede Naya. Syat is supposed to be the sign of truth. It is relative and it has gradual knowledge. Syat eliminates the contradiction between divergent standpoints. Rejection of the theory of Syadvada is tantamount to the adoption of absolute viewpoint which goes counter to all experience.
According to the Jainas, pramana cannot be unconditional and exclusive. Affirmation and negation both are to be found in every judgment. From the standpoint of substance, the object is existent, eternal, universal and one, while from the standpoint of modes it is nonexistent, particular, ephemeral and many. The Jainas have illustrated Syadvada by the anecdote of an elephant and six blind persons. These blind persons wanted to have an idea of the shape of the elephant. Touching the different parts of the body of the elephant with their hands, they mistook the particular parts for the elephant.
Thus different persons touched different parts like ears, eyes trunk, forehead, belly, etc., and they formed their own conception about the shape of the elephant accordingly. One of them compared it to fan, another to a pillar. For another blind person, it resembled a well and so on. For every one of them his own knowledge was absolute and correct, while that of others was wrong and contrary to facts. In the same way, all the philosophical schools embody one-sided truth. All the philosophers, like blind men in the above-mentioned story, harp on their own theories and criticize the theories of others.
A person, who has eyes to see, knows that all the blind persons are equally wrong in their absolute assertion in favour of their own view, although relatively, each one was correct. Thus, from its own standpoint, each philosophy is correct. But if it pretends to be the sole embodiment of absolute truth and dubs other philosophies as false and fallacious, then it is thoroughly mistaken. The modern objective realists have pointed this out to be the fallacy of exclusive particularity.
The Importance of the word syat:
The Jainas insists that the word syat should necessarily be used before every Naya. The word syat prefixed to a judgment denotes that the truth of that judgment is confined to that particular context and that it may not hold good in other contexts. Therefore, according to the Jaina philosophers, the use of the word syat is imperative for rendering the judgment flawless and correct.
Kinds of Judgment:
The Jainas have divided judgments from different standpoints into seven categories. The judgment, in which an object is related to its own attribute or symptoms, is called Astivachaka Paramarsa or affirmative judgment. On the other hand, the judgment in which the absence of relationship is pointed between an object and the attribute and symptoms of other objects, is known as Nastivachaka Paramarsa or negative judgment. The following arc the seven categories of judgment.
1. Syad Asti:
The first judgment is that from its own standpoint, the object can exist, e.g., ‘the Jar, as made of clay, exists in my room, at the present moment, of such a shape and size.’
2. Syad Nasti:
From the point of view of material place, time and nature of another thing, the object is not, i.e., it is nothing. Thus, “the jar does not exist as made of metal, (at a different) place or time, or (of a different) shape and size.”
3. Syad Astinasti:
From the point of view of the above mentioned quaternary, relating to itself and another thing, it may be said that a thing is and is not. In a certain sense the jar exists and yet in another, it does not. One says here what a thing is as well as what it is not.
4. Syad Avaktavyam:
While in the above-mentioned three judgments one makes statements that a thing is in its own self and is not as another, it becomes impossible to make these statements simultaneously. It is in this sense that a thing is unpredictable. Though the presence of its own nature and the absence of any other nature are both together in the jar, still one cannot express them. The colour of the jar sometimes may also be such that it cannot be described in one specific- manner. From the philosophical point of view, the judgment of unpredictability is important in many ways. The following are the main among them—
(a) According to Syad avaktavyam, while gradual description of an object from different standpoints is possible, a thing cannot be described by stating simultaneously contradictory characteristics. So such objects are termed indescribable.
(b) All the queries cannot be answered affirmatively or negatively. There are many questions which cannot be answered at all.
(c) Contradiction is a defect. Contradictory natures cannot be attributed to a thing simultaneously.
5. Syad Asti Avaktavyam:
The remaining three Nayas are formed by adding the fourth Naya to the first three respectively. The Fifth Naya is attained by the combination of the first and the fourth Nayas. Thus from the stand-point of the fifth Naya, a thing ‘is’ and ‘is unpredictable’ also at the same time. The jar can be described red from a particular view. But if the view is not specifically mentioned, it becomes impossible to describe its colour. So from a broad standpoint, the jar is red as well as indescribable.
6. Syad Nasti Avaktavyam:
By combining the second and the fourth Nayas respectively, one comes across the sixth Naya. According to it, a thing ‘is not’ and is also ‘unpredictable’. Therefore, one can say that the jar is not red, and also that it is avaktavyam.
7. Syad Asti Nasti Avaktavyam:
Similarly, the combination of the third and the fourth Nayas leads to the seventh Nayas. According to it, from one standpoint, the jar is red, while from another standpoint it is not red. But when the standpoint is not clear, the jar is indescribable. According to this judgment, the object is ‘not’ and is also ‘indescribable’.
A thing may have many characteristics. Bui there can be only the above mentioned seven judgments about its different characteristics. The above-mentioned judgments can be imagined in relation to substance, space, time or existence. The Jaina philosophy is realistic and relativist. According to the Jaina, judgment is not only a mental process, but also a means of knowing the external things. A concept, to be true, must necessarily manifest the nature of the external things. Knowledge is relative, and yet it depends not on mind, but on the actual nature of things.
Criticism of Syadvada:
Other Indian philosophical thinkers have bitterly criticized the Jaina theory of Syadvada. The reason for criticism can be summarized as follows:
(1) The Buddhists and the Vedantins have regarded it as nothing more than a negative theory. They take syad in the sense of probability and they have based their criticism on it. The same thing cannot be present and absent in the same sense. Philosophers like Dhannakirti, Santa Rakshit and Samkaracharya treat this theory as the ravings of mad men. To Ramanuja it is as impossible to roll into one thing the contradictory qualities of existence and non-existence as it is to bracket light and darkness together.
But the clarification given above exposes the ignorance of the Buddhists and Vedantic philosophers about Syadvada. According to Jaina view, everything has more than one quality. Though existent and eternal from the standpoint substance, it is many, non-existent and ephemeral from the standpoint of modes. A thing is existent from the viewpoints of its own substance, form, time and scope. Thus, it admits of no contradiction.
A thing is regarded existent, non-existent, existent non-existent and inexpressible not from one standpoint but from different standpoints. Thus the Jain philosophers retort that oblivious of this vital and fundamental fact and afraid of imaginary contradictions, foolish people regard the relative as the absolute and thus are led astray from truth.
(2) The second objection, raised by Samkaracharya, nevertheless, points out a real defect of Syadvada. If everything, argues Samkara, is merely probable, then syadvada cannot be an exception. In fact, the theory of Anckantika also hinges on Ekantika. In other words, the seven nayas of Syadvada are disconnected and cannot be synthesized. Of course, the Jainas believe both in absoluteness and in relativity but they do not seek to effect any synthesis between the two.
While propounding Syadvada, they forget its implications and regard their own theory as the sole gospel of truth. The Jainas criticize satkaryavada by asatkaryavada and vice versa.
They differentiate between Sakaladesa and Vikaladesa. The latter term is applied to scattered groups of particular truths; the former refers to the absolute truth. In the words of’ Yasovijaya, the Jaina outlook is the best as ail the Nayas are “brought together simultaneously in it.
But mere togetherness does not mean coherence. In the absence of an absolute element, the diverse relative elements cannot be united by any means whatsoever. Yasovijaya asserts that Anekantavada is characterized by impartiality because it metes out the same treatment to all the different nayas.
Just as a father does not and should not discriminate between his sons, so Anekantavada does not differentiate between the various Nayas. But this equality tends to overlook the diversity and thus leads to dogmatism. According to Hem Chandra, all the philosophical schools, except the Jaina, are relative, biased and revel in criticizing one another. Only the Jaina philosophy provides a welcome relief, as it is free from bias and treats the different Nayas alike. These statements seem contradictory to the relativist catholic spirit of syadvada.
As the absolute element is missing, this equality is reduced to mere conglomeration. Really speaking, Anekantavada not only possesses relative truth, but also suffers from relative un-truth. If all the theories are true only from a particular standpoint, how can the Jaina philosophy be an exception to this rule? It necessarily follows, but that the Jaina philosophical school must also contain, not absolute, but only relative truth.
The Jainas refute the theory of reality as ineffable. But, as a matter of fact, the indescribable nature of the fourth Nayas of syadvada is but another name for what is regarded as ineffable. The Jainas themselves sometimes support absolutism. But they very conveniently forget it, when in all earnestness and with great fervour, they propound Syadvada.
(3) The Jaina philosophy does not seek to transcend relativist and pluralism and so it does not recognise absolutism and monism. It does not distinguish between different relative judgments.
(4) Of the seven Nayas of Syadavada, the last three appear to be mere repetitions of the first four Nayas. According to Kumarila Bhatta, if divided that way, the Nayas can even have a hundred categories instead of only seven.
(5) By taking the Absolute only as a conglomeration of parts, the Jainas have blurred the conception of their Kevala Jnana also. They have thus made it ambiguous and indistinct. Kevala Jnana is other-worldly, absolute and immediate. But even then the Jainas refuse to differentiate between temporal and otherworldly (Paramarthika) knowledge. In fact, Kevala Jnana and Syadvada have become contradictory.
It is worth noting that some Jaina philosophers like Samantabhadra, Hem Chandra and Siddhasena have drawn a distinction between temporal and otherworldly knowledge and have brought themselves nearer to Vedanta philosophy. In fact, without absolutism, the relativism of the Jainas is incomplete.
Seven Kinds of Fundamental Elements:
According to the Jainas, the natural and supernatural things of the universe can be traced back to seven fundamental elements, viz., Jiva, Ajiva, Astrava, Bandit a, Samvara, Nirjana and Moksa.
The combination of jiva and ajiva is termed astikaya also.Astikaya is a form of substance. This substance is of two types, viz., astikaya and nastikaya., Subatances like the body, which exist and envelop, are astikaya, while nastikayas have no body at all. In it only time (kala) is reckoned.
The substane is the basis of attributes (dharma). The attributes, which we find in it, are known as dharmas. According to the Jainas, things have many attributes. Broadly, these attributes are divided into two categories, viz., Bhavatmaka and Abhavatmaka. Those attributes, which indicate the form and condition of a thing, are known as bhavatmaka. On the other hand, the attributes which indicate the distinction of a thing from other things are termed as abhavatmaka.
These attributes also change with the change of time (kala). From this point of view, the attributes of a substance are either essential and eternal (swaroopa and nitya dharma), or adventitious and changeable (agantuka and parivartanasila). Without essential attributes, a thing cannot exist. So they are always present in everything. For example, while consciousness is the essence of the soul, desire, determination, happiness and sorrow are its changeable attributes.
The universe consists of substances. Because of the two above-mentioned attributes, the substance is both eternal and ephemeral. Thus both the philosophical schools of Buddhism and Vedanta are one-sided and incomplete. Substance is real. All the three attributes of real existence, viz., birth, destruction and eternity are present in it.
The Jainar define Jiva or Atman as conscious substance. Atmar in this world is known as Jiva. It has vital and physical, mental and sensuous powers. In its pure condition, Jiva has pure knowledge and vision i.e., Nirvikalpa and Savikalpa Jnana. But due to the effect of Karma, Jiva is yoked with five Bhavasatvas viz., Aupasamik, “Kshayik, Kshayopasamik, Audayik and Parinamik. Jiva with Pudgala or matter is termed as sansari or worldly. Jaina philosophy is parinamavadin. It believes that causes change into real effects. So bhavas change into dravya and vice versa.
The Attributes of Jivas:
Jiva is self-illuminated and illuminates other things also. It is eternal and pervades the whole body. It enjoys the fruits of actions and tends to go upwards. Karma enters into it due to eternal ignorance and binds it in shackles. The fettered Jiva is conscious. Possessed of the qualities of flexibility and resilience, it assumes the form of the body it enters. The expansion of Jiva differs from that of inanimate objects. It does not envelop the body; it is felt in each of its parts. One inanimate object cannot enter into another inanimate object But Atman can enter into matter.
Similarly, one Jiva can enter into another Jiva. Jiva has no form and is therefore not the object of eyes. Its existence is determined by self-experience. In the released state, it attains right knowledge. Jiva haspradesas, which are also called paryayas or modes. So Jiva is called astikaya (possessingpradesa or body). Jiva is parinami or resultant. It is ever characterized by birth, destruction and eternity. This is due to the effect of time.
Jiva is inherently possessed of infinite perception, infinite knowledge and infinite power. Their manifestation is blocked by the clock of actions.
Feeling or consciousness and the result of consciousness are the special attributes of Jiva. Knowledge is also of two kinds: attributed knowledge and knowledge without attributes. The former is of eight kinds, viz., Mali, Sruta, Avadhi, Manahparyaya and Kevala, and three viparyayas viz, Kumati, Kusruta and Vibhan-gavadani. Kevala Jnana is pure and manifests itself after the annihilation of actions.
The Paryayas of Jiva:
There are four paryayas and parinamas of Jiva, viz., Divya, Maruisa, Narakiya and Tiryak. Paryaya is also of two kinds, viz., dravya paryaya and jiva paryaya. Dravya paryaya gives us a vision of unity in the diversity of paryayas. Paryaya is a term applied to the changes which occur in the attributes of dravyas due to parinama.
For example, mango sheds its green colour and becomes pale, though it retains its nature. Dravya paryaya is also of two kinds, viz., samana jatiya dravya paryaya and asamana jatiya pravya daryaya. The former is the outcome of the combination of in animate substances, while the latter is born out of the combination of inanimate and animate substances. Skandhas and human body are the instances of both these categories respectively. The Jainas are sadbhavavadins. The body no doubt, perishes, but never the soul or bhava, which, though assuming different forms-divine, human and hellish is, nevertheless, eternal. Dravya is eternal. Paryaya, on the other hand, is ephemeral. The Jaina theory of Anekantavada seeks to explain this belief of theirs.
The different kinds of Jiva:
Broadly speaking, Jiva is of two kinds, viz., Baddha (Bound) and Mukta (Free). The former is further subdivided into two categories viz., Trs of jangama and sthavara. The sthavara jivas possess only one sense organ, viz., ‘Tvak Indriya’. Earth, water, fire, air and the vegetable world fall in this category. The jivas, possessing more than one sense-organ are termed as Trs.
Thus human beings, birds, animals, gods and devils are included in the category of TRS jivas, These jivas have five sense-organs. They have different names, which are determined by the kinds of bodies they possess. Jivas who like stones, assume earthly bodies are known as prithvikaya. Similarly, apakaya jivas are those who assume watery bodies. So also we have Vayukaya and Tejahkaya jivas, meaning those having the bodies of air and light respectively.
Proof of the existence of soul:
According to Jaina philosophers, the proofs for the existence of soul are also of two kinds., viz., direct and indirect. Lashing out vehemently at the scepticism of the Charvakas, Gunaratna has put forth a direct proof of the existence of soul. When we see the attributes or qualities of soul, we directly realize the existence of soul. The perception of attributes is tantamount to the perception of the substance. I feel that I am happy. This feeling enables me to have a direct realisation of the existence of soul. Similarly, the experience of different attributes e.g., sorrow, memory, thought, doubt and knowledge leads to the direct realisation of the possessor of these attributes, i.e., the soul.
The following are the indirect proofs of the existence of the soul:
(1) The body can be moved according to one’s will. So there must be its mover, the soul.
(2) The sense-organs like eyes, ears, etc., are the various instruments of knowledge. Without a co-ordinator, knowledge cannot be gathered through these sense-organs. The soul is the required co-ordinator.
(3) Besides material cause, an efficient cause is also required for the production of inanimate objects, e.g., a jar or a piece of cloth. The body also cannot come into existence without an efficient cause. The soul is the efficient cause of the existence of the body.
Refutation of the Charvaka view of the soul:
The Jainas have given the following arguments against the Charvaka view of the soul:
(1) There is no direct evidence to indicate that consciousness is produced by elements nor can it be inferred, because no concomitant relationship can be discerned between the body and the consciousness.
(2) Cause-effect relationship also does not exist between the body and the consciousness, because the growth or decline of the one does not entail the growth or decline of the other. The inanimate elements are merely instruments. They cannot produce consciousness unless aided by an efficient cause. The soul is such an efficient cause.
(3) The soul is intimately connected with the Body. So one does not feel its existence as independent and separate from the body. Therefore, sentences like ‘I am fat’ etc., are to be taken figuratively, not literally.
(4) The thing, whose existence is refuted, definitely exists somewhere else in some form or the other.
According to the Jainas, the second element besides Jiva is Ajiva. Ajiva is of five kinds viz., Merit (Dharma), Demerit (Adharma), Ether (Akasha), Matter (Pudgat) and Time (Kala). Out of these five ajivas, the first four have many bodies (pradesas). Therefore, they are called embodied (astikaya). Time has only one body and is therefore not astikaya. All the ajiva elements are substances. They never perish. All these elements, save matter, have no form, taste, touch or smell. Matter, of course, has all these four attributes. Each of the first three ajivas, i.e., Metrit, Demerit and Akasa is in fact only one, while matter and time are many. Unlike the first three ajivas, the last two ajivas have motion also. The attributes of pudgala are also found in atom (ami) and samghata. These ajiva elements should now be considered one by one.
Dharmastikaya is neither active, nor can it produce action in others. But it helps the active pundgals and jivas their actions. It pervades the lokakasa. It is bereft of form, taste, touch, smell and sound. Though resultant (parinami) it is eternal. Though subject to birth and decay, it does not abandon its form. Dharma and Adharma are the cause of the motion and status respectively.
It helps jiva and matter when they are at rest. Though the antithesis of dharma, it lacks form, taste, smell and touch. It pervades lokakasa and is shapeless and eternal. Dharma and adharma coexist in lokakasa. Both are eternal, shapeless and motionless.
Akasha is that which accommodates Jiva, Ajiva, Adharma, Kala and Pudgal. This is also called lokakasa. Alokakasa is where these dravyas find no accommodation. The former has number less pradesas, while the latter has limitless pradesas. Akasha is not visible. It is the object of inference. But for akasa, the astikaya dravyas can have no expansion. Alokakasa is beyond lokakasa. Lokakasa is the dwelling place of jiva and other dravyas.
That which can be combined and divided or that which results through combination or disintegration is known as-pudgala. The smallest part of pudgala is amu or atom. It is indivisible. Samghat or skandlut is born out of the combination of two or more atoms. These include human body and other dravyas. Mind, speech and breath are also made of inanimate objects. Matter has four qualities, viz., form, taste smell and touch. These qualities characterize atoms and their combinations also. Matter is a limited and concrete substance. It has eight kinds of touch viz., sot., harsh, heavy, light, cold, hot, oily and rough. Its smell is of two kinds viz., fragrance and odour. It has colour of five kinds, viz., black, blue, red, yellow and white. It has two shapes, viz., atomic and skandha.
The combination of two atoms produces Dvipradesa and that of Dvipradesa and one atom produces Tripradesa. Thus gross, grosser and grossest substances are gradually produced. According to Amrit Chandra Suri, material dravyas are also of subtle, subtler and subtlest forms. Matter has many resultants like sound, bondage, groossness, shape, distinction, darkness, shadow, light and heat. By contact with matter, jiva acquires motion. Matter has touch, colour, taste and smell, while shapeless substances lack these qualities.
According to Umaswami, change, result, motion, newness and oldness of things are caused by kala only. Kala is also the cause of the products of pudgal and other dravyas. It is eternal—hence the perpetual motion which characterizes the pudgal. Kala is also known as samaya. Hour, minute day, night, etc., are the differed forms of samaya. Samaya is parinamabhava and kshanika (ephemeral or momentary). It is also termed ‘Kala Anu’ Kala Anu pervades pradesa only and therefore has no body (Kaya) These ‘Kala anus’ pervade lokakasa. They do not meet one another. Every kala anu exists separately. They are invisible, shapeless, motionless and numberless. ‘Nishaya Kala’ is eternal and is helpful in the parinama of dravyas. It is the basis of time Samaya is also called practical time. Thus the Jaina philosophers distinguish between Parmarthika kala (Transcendental time) and Vyavaharika kala (Practical time). The latter has beginning and end.
The former is eternal and shaeless. Vartana is due toparamar- thika kala. Other changes are due to vyavahariak kala. According to Gunaratna, some Jaina philosophers do not accept kala as an independent substance, but only as a modification of other substances. It is an indivisible substance and is therefore Nastikaya. It is all-pervading and without particles.
The entrance of karma matter into the body of Jiva through yoga is known as astrava. Yoga is a process of action speech and mind. Thus Astrava is a cause of the bondge of Jiva. Jiva and mother exist in lokakasa from limitless time. The karmas of jiva are also with them. By contact with anadiavidya (Eternal ignorance) four kasayas, viz., Anger (Krodha), Greed (Lobha). Egotism (Mana) and illusion (Maya) also accompany Jiva. The result of the actions of Jiva is also present with pudgals in the forms of impressions. Karma pudgals are inanimate and therefore cannot enter Jiva.
Hence, the necessity of the action of body, speech and mind before karma pudgalas enter jiva, the latter feels a sort of sensation (spandana) on account of activities body, speech and mind. The sensations due to these activitie,’ of the three faculties are termed Kayayoga, Vagyoga and Manoyoga respectively
Kinds of Astrava:
Astrava is of forty-two kinds. Out of these Kayayoga, Vagyoga, Manoyoga five sense organs, four kasayas and non-observance of five Vratas, non-violence (Ahimsa), truth (Satya) etc., are especially important In addition to these, there an near about twenty-five small Astravas.
All of them lead to human bondage. Astrava is also divided into Bhavastrava and Dravyastrava. The former refers to the changes in the bhava of Jiva before the entrance of the karma pudgalas into it.
The changes occurring after the entrance of the karma pudgals fall in the second category. Karma pudgal stick to Jiva like the particles of dust that stick to the body massaged with oil. In this instance, oil massage is Bhavastrava and sticking of dus is Dravyastrava.
The overshadowing of jiva by pudgals due to kasayas is termed bondage or Bandha Tattva by the Jainas. Mental tendencies are responsible for the bondage of Jiva. Conscious thoughts and feelings are the root cause of the bondage of astrava and pudgal is the result of such thoughts.
Bhavastrava is born before the entrance of pudgals into Jiva. The bondage of Jiva, which follows it, is known as Bhavahandha. Dravyastrava follows entrance of pudgal into Jiva. The bondage, which involves Jiva in it is termed Dravya bandha. Astrava destroys the real form of jiva and consequently it is exposed to bondage.
Apart from these two factors, there are other causes of the bondage of jiva like karma, falsehood, attachment and non-observance of the rules of penance. In the state of bondage, jiva and pudgals enter into one and another. Jiva and pudgals are present in each and every part of the living body. Pudgal and jiva inter-mingle like water and milk.
According to the Jaina philosophy, liberation is the escape of Jiva from matter. It is also its summum bonum. In Jaina philosophy, two kinds of liberation are conceived—bhava moksha and dravya moksha. Attachment and the like can be destroyed by obeying the laws or by meditation.
Then astrava is destroyed by sanvar and nirjara. In this way, freed of the matter and having become supreme and a superior spectator, one experiences freedom. This state is called ‘Bhava Moksha’ or ‘Jiva Mukti’. This is the initial state of real liberation, in which the four destructible karmas—jnanavarsha, darshanvarniya, mohaniya and antarava arc destroyed.
After this the respective destruction of the four indestructible karmas- anu, name, gotra, vedaniya—leads to dravya moksha. At the same time, it is freed from the aupasamika, kshayopasamika, audayika and bluivatva state.
Then adopting vertical motion, it reaches the limits of the upper world. Dharmastikaya does not exist in the super-natural enlightened world. Thus, Jiva can neither proceed farther than this loka nor return to the world. Consequently, it lives eternally in ‘Sidhashila’.
Thus the Jainas hold that sanvar and nurjara are the means to moksha. Sanvar element stops astrava and ‘bandha’. With it, the Jiva is freed from attachment, hatred and love, obtains equanimity for pleasure and pain and becomes free of distortions with the result that material particles do not enter into it to cause any limitations. Sanvar has two distinctions— (i) bhava sanvar and (ii) dravya sanvar. Initially, in sanvar, distortions like love, hatred and attachment are negatived, the state being allied ‘bhava sanvar’. Following this, the entry of matter is stopped. This is called ‘dravya sanvar’. One the entry of karma particles has been stopped, it cannot be started afresh. When all the karma matter of Jiva has been destroyed, he attains moksha. In nirjara moksha, the residual karma particles are destroyed.
The Jainas have suggested the following ways of obstructing the entry of karma— (1 ) samitian, (2) guptiyan, (3)punch mahavrata, (4) karma, (5) anuprek- sayen, (6) purishaha (7) charitra or character. These are described below:
Samitian are the five external means for stopping karma. They are— (i) Erya samiti—meaning obedience to the law of movement, (ii) Bhasa samiti— meaning obedience to the law of speech. (iv)Aisana samiti— meaning, saving a part of the alms for religious work, (v) Pratisthapana samiti—meaning refusing alms.
Interrupting the conjunction of karma and self is called ‘Gupti’. The following distinctions of gupti corresponds to those of the conjunction—(i) Kaya Gupti—means negation of physiological activity, (ii) Vag Gupti— means negation of auditory activity, (iii) Mano Gupti—means negation of mental activity like volition.
In samiti, the gravitation towards true activity is a major point. In this state man is engaged in good work. The negation of false activity is of major importance in ‘gupti’. It puts a stop to bad activity.
3. Panch mahavrata:
The panch mahavratas also have importance in stopping the entry of karma particles into the self by following the five vows—ahimsa (non-violence), satya (truthfulness), asteya (non-stealing), bralimacharya (celibacy) and aparigraha (non-covetousness).
This principle of the Jainas is based on the postulate that all beings are equal. In ahimsa, the mind, speech and action become permeated with non-violence. Ahimsa means abstention from annihilation of living beings. It orbits the killing of any beings, not just some beings. To follow this law is difficult for common house-hold people.
Satya or truth means (includes) the complete banishment of falsity. The ideal of truth to be observed is the truth accepted by and useful to all. Thus the observance of staya vrata means not only staying at distance from greed, fear and anger but also abstaining from decrying ridiculing, verbosity, etc.
Asteya is the non-acceptance of material things from others without giving something in return. Ahimsa has intimate relation with asteya. Existence of life depends upon wealth, so looting of wealth amounts to killing of living beings. Thus thieving too is equally bad.
Sacrifice of a abstention from passion is called brahmacharya or celibacy. It implies the sacrifice all actions, not merely of sensual pleasures. Complete sacrifice of all desires, whether mental or physical, fine or gross, worldly or supernatural egoistic or altruistic is equally essential for the observance of celibacy.
This means sacrifice of attachment to all objects of desire and implies sacrifice even of the objects of speech, touch, vision, taste and smell. Non-attachment of worldly objects is needed for liberation.
The Jainas have enumerated ten dharmas, the obedience to which is safeguard against kannas entering the soul. These ten dharmas are—forgiveness, sweetness, simplicity, cleanliness, truth, self-control, penance, sacrifice, indifference and celibacy.
According to the Jainas, those who contemplate upon liberation must be imbued with twelve feelings or ampreksha. These twelve are— (i) Anitya—meaning that everything except religion is to be treated as transient, (ii) Asliarana—meaning that truth is only shelter, (iii) Sansara—feeling of life and death, (iv) Aikatva-—meaning that Jiva is solely responsible for his own karmas. (v)Anyatva—meaning that the soul is to be treated as separate from the body, (vi) Asuchi—implying treatment of the body and bodily objects as impure, (vii) Astrava—feeling of entrance of the karma, (viii) Sanvar—feeling of negation of the entrance of karma. Success in sanvar comes only after acute addition and those who contemplate it have to obey strict laws, (ix) Nirjara—the feeling to eliminate karma particles embedded in the self. (x) Loka—feeling for self, body and objects of the world, (xi) Bodhidurlabluitva—feeling that understanding of proper knowledge and proper character is difficult to obtain, (xii) Dluirmaniipreksha— non-deviation from the religious path and desire to introduce stability in it.
According to Umaswaini, “Those who are capable of staying in the religious path and suffering for the destruction of Karmas are called purisaha. These are twenty-two—hunger, thirst, cold, heat, mosquito bite, nakedness (to bear nakedness with fortitude), detachment from sex, living in solitude, remaining undeviated from posture, sayya, anger, murder, pleading, non-attainment, sickness, tranasparsha, being oblivious to any dirt that may accumulate during meditation and avoiding any effort to remove it, hospitality, reward, knowledge, ignorance and non-perception.
Besides the above purisaha, it is necessary to generate the following five characteristics : (i) Samyak charitra-—meaning, staying in equanimity. (ii) Dosa sthapana—confession of one’s mistake in front of the teacher, and taking his advice, (iii) Parihara visuddhi. (iv) Suksma samparaya with the exception of greed, the non-creation of kdsaya like anger, etc., and (v) Yath- khyata negation of all kusaya.
The destruction of karma particles which are the seeds of limitation, is called nirjara. These particles are the ones already adhering to the self. The above mentioned sixty-two methods can prevent any further addition of karma particles but it is equally essential to destroy the old karma particles. That is why nirjara is needed. In order to arrive at this state, it is essential to sacrifice evil traits like attachment, etc., and to have nididhyasana. This makes the mind flexible and pure and the Jiva can recognize the soul situated in its own body. Thereupon, the person becomes bereft of his pain, and begins to experience self-realization—the ultimate end of ethics, philosophy and religion.
Distinctions of Nirjara:
Nirjara has two distinctions bhava nirjara and dravya nirjara. When in the affective state a feeling of nirjara grows, it is called bhava nirjara. After this, the actual destruction of karma particles residing in the self is called ‘dravya nirjara. Bhava nirjara, too has two distinctions. When the particles are automatically destroyed after enjoyment, it is called ‘avipaka’ or anama bhava nirjara. But if these karmas are destroyed even before enjoyment is finished, it is called ‘vipaka or sakama bhava nirjara. The second requires internal mediation. Anashana., avamodarya, vritti sanksepa rasatyaga, vivikta sluiyyasana, kaya klesa are six external penances. Remorse, humility vayya vritti or service of saints, swadhyaya, or self-study, Vyutsarg or indifference to objects and meditation are six internal penances.
Triratna or Three jewels:
Sanvar prevents any new influx of karma particles. Nirjara path to liberation is triratna or three jewels viz., right faith, right knowledge and right character.
1. Right Faith:
According to Umaswami, right faith implies faith in real knowledge i.e., in the essence of the Jaina preaching. Faith increases with meditation and it can be perfect only when complete knowledge has been obtained.
2. Right knowledge:
While in right faith the knowledge is merely of the essence of Jaina preachings, in right knowledge, there is specialized knowledge of the rudiments of Jiva and Ajiva. It is beyond doubt and without defect. For this too, karmas must be destroyed. Kevala Jnana can come only after karmas have been destroyed.
3. Right character:
It includes the adoption of beneficial activities and the abandoning of harmful ones. This frees the Jiva from the karmas.
However, it requires the observance of the following:
(1) Obedience to panch maliavrata.
(2) Carefulness in moving, talking, accepting favours and excreting urine etc.
(3) Practice of Gupti in mind, speech ad religion.
(4) Conduct of ten dharmas viz., forgiveness, softness, simplicity, truth, cleanliness, self-control, penance, sacrifice, disenchantment and celibacy.
(5) Feeling related to the real element in the Jiva and the world.
(6) Suffering pains of hunger, thirst, heat and cold.
(7) Practicing equality, softness, munificence and good character.
The foregoing detailed description of the causes of bondage and the means for their removal must have made it quite clear that the Jaina philosophers have made deep forays into this field of human experience. The Jaina philosophy has consequently made a significant contribution to Indian ethics.